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1 Introduction.
Increased awareness and concern for health and the environment, coupled
with rising living standards, have brought quality attributes of industrial
products under the limelight. Increasingly, in the wealthier and more in-
dustrialized countries, consumers and public authorities are giving weight
to quality attributes such as nutritional content, safety, functionality, and
environmental impact. Many people are hence prepared to pay a premium
for goods that improve health standards, preserve the environment, or are
produce in an ethical way. In the process, problems arise linked to the pos-
sibility for consumer deception and, more generally, to the efficient signaling
of quality attributes of goods and services. Indeed, confronted with the
worldwide division of labor and specialization, individuals and firms can no
longer trace the origin or control the composition of consumption goods or
inputs. Permanent flows of innovations and the introduction of new prod-
ucts exacerbate the problem. This is obviously true for complex goods like
electricity generated from nuclear power, but it is also true for more simple
commodities like agricultural produce with, for instance, the appearance of
genetically modified organisms (OGMs). This paper proposes a simple theo-
retical framework to handle the issue of quality signaling in a global market
economy and the subsequently rising need for certification. In a second part
we illustrate the foregoing model using the seed certification process, and its
relation to agricultural productivity.
The issue of quality signaling can be better understood once different
categories of goods are acknowledged. Nelson (1970) and Darbi and Karni
(1973) developed a useful categorization between search, experience and cre-
dence attributes. Search attributes are those for which consumers can assess
their quality or qualities before purchasing them. Typical examples are ex-
ternal physical attributes such as color, size, polish and style (e.g. shoes).
Experience attributes are those for which consumers cannot assess the quali-
ties until they have purchased and used or consumed them. Typical examples
are taste, system functionality, performance, or productivity. It is only by
trialing the goods, with experience, that the quality can be assessed (e.g.
software, cars). Finally, credence attributes are those for which consumers
can assess the quality attributes neither before nor after purchase and use.
Typical cases refer to the environmental impact at the production stage, or to
health and safety related attributes such as food nutritional composition, or
the chemical formula of a drug. Historically, as the set of products and tech-
nological processes have broadened to encompass more of credence goods,
consumers’ awareness and demand for quality have risen over time. As a
result, quality signaling to consumers has become a major problem.
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One practical solution to this problem is the process known as certifi-
cation. Certification may be defined as a process whereby an unobservable
quality level of some product is made known to the consumer through some
labeling system, usually issued by a third independent party. There are both
product and process certification, the first linked mostly to consumption,
the second linked mostly to production. Obviously, a major concern with
certification is consumer confidence which depends on the credibility of the
certification process and stamp. It must be done by an authority above all
suspicion. In developed countries it can be a government agency such as the
Food and Drug Administration in the United States, or a private certifica-
tion firm such as Underwriters Laboratories who is issuing the US Green Seal
ecolabel.1 A second concern which is directly linked to the first one is that
to signal quality without uncertainty or with little uncertainty, certification
is costly and may indeed be very costly in some cases. Typical examples
relate to health and environmental safety. The assessment of biophysical,
biochemical, and microbiological attributes usually require costly equipment
and highly trained and highly paid personnel. In addition, such assessment
procedures take time.
It is natural to assume that the costlier the certification process, the fewer
will be the firms able to afford one. However, to what extent this statement
is true, and how it affects firms as an incentive to certify or not to certify, is
not very clear. Moreover, how these supply factors will meet the demand for
certification, which is the driving force behind the whole process, and what
the characteristics of a market for certification will be, is not clear either.
Particularly, will cost of certification be a major factor in deciding market
structure, with very high costs leading to a monopoly for certification? This
paper which focuses on the issue of credence attribute, aims to investigate
these questions.
There is a substantial body of empirical literature dealing with the issue
of labeling and certification. Fields of application relate to food safety and
quality and to the environment.2 In particular, there is a vast applied liter-
ature on the ISO 9000 norms on product quality management, and on the
1Credibility is sometimes difficult to achieve even for the state. For instance in France
the government has lost credibility because it has poorly handled the information re-
lated to major incidents such as the HIV-contaminated blood, the bovine spongiform en-
cephalopaty, or the Chernobyl radioactive cloud. Similarly in countries where corruption
runs high, the government has little or no credibility.
2For instance regarding food safety and quality, the role of labeling (Caswell-Mojduszka,
1996), whether quality management should be mandatory or voluntary (Segerson, 1999;
MacDonald et al., 1999), the financing of food safety certification (MacDonald et al.,
1999; Crespi-Marette, 2000), and the role of consumer research for food policy initiatives
(Tregear et al., 1998) have been explored.
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ISO 14000 norms on environmental management systems.3 By contrast the
issue of credence attributes has yielded, until recently, very little theoretical
work.4
A noticeable exception is the literature on the extent to which the certi-
fication process is credible to consumers. Biglaiser (1993) and Lizzeri (1999)
specifically focused on certification agents as intermediaries between pro-
ducers and consumers in the process of quality provision. Albano-Lizzeri
(1997) investigate the effect of monopoly on quality provision and certifica-
tion. These papers focus on the strategic manipulation of information by
the certification intermediaries. They show that a monopoly intermediary
will not fully disclose its information about quality. It will rather provide
noisy signals, but these still increase efficiency with respect to the situation
without any signal. They also show that competition among the intermedi-
aries can lead to full information revelation. An other valuable aspect of this
literature focuses on the problem of experts (e.g., lawyers, medical doctors,
auto mechanics service-persons). Experts’ diagnosis and cures are typically
credence attributes. Wolinsky (1993) has shown how customers’ search for
multiple opinions and reputation considerations each play a role in disciplin-
ing experts. Emons (1997) and Emons (2000) explores whether in markets for
experts, the market mechanism may induce non fraudulent behavior. Evans
shows that if consumers have enough information about market data, they
are able to infer the expert’s incentives. He thus shows that market equi-
librium resulting in non fraudulent behavior does exist. However in other
cases there is no trade because consumers anticipate fraudulent behavior.
These important papers point out to the difficulty in achieving an efficient
market for certification. This suggests that public intervention might be a
good thing in this area.5
3Regarding the environment, work has focused on ecolabeling and eco-certification,
in particular on consumer preferences and demand for ecolabeled products (Blend-van
Ravenswaay, 1999 and Wessels et al., 1999), on the value of eco-labels (Nimon-Beghin,
1999) and eco-certification (Teisl et al., 1999), while Mattoo and Singh (1994) explored
policy implications of ecolabeling. See also the paper by Crampes-Ibanez (1996) that is
dealing with the issue of green label. Lesourd and Schilizzi (2001: chapter 9) provide
an overview. Specific interest has been shown for forestry and forest products certifi-
cation, especially in Canada (Haener et al., 1998; Lyke, 1996; Mater, 1995), while van
Ravenswaay-Blend (1999) explore ecolabeling as a means to encourage adoption of envi-
ronmental technologies in agriculture, and Foseid (2000) reports on the role of certification
in increasing markets for compost.
4Most of the theoretical literature has focused on quality signaling for experience at-
tributes (for a discussion of this literature see section 2.1).
5Along these lines, Anania-Nistico (2000) focus on public regulation to solve the prob-
lem of quality signaling in food markets. They consider the problem of an only partially
credible regulation. There is also the paper by Crespi-Marette’s (2000) which focuses on
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The present paper aims to complement this literature by completely ab-
stracting from the issue of the credibility of the certification process. Instead,
it focuses on the impact of certification costs on market structure and per-
formance. The paper contains a theoretical and an empirical investigation.
Theoretically, it analyses the problem of quality provision when the quality is
costly to produce and unobservable by the consumer. To credibly signal qual-
ity firms need to rely on the costly process of certification. We show that the
private incentives to self-certify quality are sub-optimal. We next study the
optimal certification policy both under private and public control. The pa-
per examines where on the public-private and on the monopoly-competitive
spectra optimal certification is to be identified and achieved. Empirically,
it investigates the as yet unexplored topic of seed certification and how its
cost may be affecting agricultural performance in developed and developing
countries.
The paper is organized as follows. A first part presents a simple model
that describes the relationship between demand for certified goods and ser-
vices, population wealth, certification costs, and market structure. A second
part examines the relevance and role of external provision of certification
when self-certification is inefficient. A third part examines agricultural seed
certification in the light of the results of the model, and compares government
vs. private certification in developed and developing countries.
2 The model
We consider a supply problem of a commodity with variable quality. The
demand stems from a continuum of consumers. For a given quality v ≥ 0,
the individual’s demand function is assumed to be linear in price p ≥ 0:
di(p, v) = βiv(a− p) (1)
The individuals’ demand is parameterized by βi ∈ [β, β] with density
function f(β) and mean Eβi = b which is a scale factor (a larger b corresponds
to a larger population), and by a ≥ 0 which corresponds to a wealth index
(a larger a corresponds to a richer population). The price elasticity of i’s
demand is p,di = − pa−p . It decreases with a in absolute terms. The larger
a is, the less the consumer behavior is affected by price increase. On the
other hand, the price elasticity is independent of βi which is a scale factor
reflecting heterogeneous need and size in the consumer population.
Quality is a vertical differentiation variable. The consumers have unan-
imous preference over the quality set. They all prefer high quality to low
certification by the public sector.
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quality at given price. Then the elasticity of demand with respect to quality
is constant no matter what the consumers’ wealth, measured by a, or their
taste or need for the commodity, measured by βi, in the total population.
That is, v,di = 1 for all (a, βi) positive.
Consumers maximize their surplus. Let Pi(q, v) = a− qβiv be the inverse
demand function, when an individual consumes a quantity q ≥ 0 of the
commodity with quality v > 0. The gross surplus for consumer i, defined as
the integral of Pi(q, v) is: S
g
i (q, v) = aq− q
2
2vβi
. We deduce the net surplus of
consumer i when purchasing a quantity qi = di(p, v) of the commodity with
quality v and unit price p is:
Si(p, v) = βi
v(a− p)2
2
. (2)
Consumers maximize their net surplus when choosing which quality spec-
ification of the commodity to purchase. It implies from equation (2) that
confronted with the quality/price bundles (vj, pj) and (vj′ , pj′) any consumer
in the group of wealth a chooses to purchase specification j if and only if
vj(a − pj)2 ≥ vj′(a − pj′)2. The consumer chooses j′ otherwise. In other
words, the choice of the commodity is not dependent on βi, whereas the
quantity purchased by each individual increases with βi. We deduce easily
the following preliminary result.
Lemma 1 The consumers in wealth group a have unanimous preference,
represented by the function v(a− p)2, over the quality/price set (v, p).
This result will prove to be useful. In particular it implies that all con-
sumers in population a purchase the same specification of quality v of the
commodity. The total demand in wealth group a is then Da,b(p, v) = v(a−p)b
where b reflects the population size (e.g., the number of consumer in group
wealth a).
On the supply side we assume that the production of the commodity
involves a constant returns to scale technology. That is, the market is a priori
competitive. If a distortion appears, it can be ascribed to the unobservable
aspect of quality (i.e. to the fact that it is a credence attribute). We can
hence isolate the impact of the quality signaling problem on market structure
and on industry performance. The minimal quality level that can be provided
by the firm is v (v ≥ 0). The cost function of producer j (j ∈ N+) may be
assumed to be linear:
C(qj, vj) = c(vj)qj (3)
where qj ≥ 0 is the quantity produced by firm j at quality vj ≥ v, and c(v)
is increasing and convex.
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In the next section, which describes a benchmark case, we assume that
quality is observable prior to purchasing -search attribute- or equivalently
verifiable through use -experience attribute-.
2.1 Quality is observable
Consider first the case of a search attribute. Under the constant returns to
scale assumption, when quality is observable prior to purchase, there is no
quality signaling problem: the market is perfectly competitive. At equilib-
rium, prices are equal to marginal cost p = c(v). At this price firms are
free to produce any quantity. However with respect to a standard Walrasian
production unit, the firms still have a strategic variable to set: the quality
level. As quality is observable prior to purchase, it is a strategic variable in
the same way as price is. If a firm fails to choose the right level of quality for
the product, it will go bankrupt (exactly as if it fails to price the commodity
at marginal cost). Indeed, by virtue of lemma 1, consumers in group a have
unanimous preferences over the quality/price set, embodied in the v(a− p)2
function. When price is set at marginal cost, the consumers in group a choose
the specification of the commodity that maximizes v(a−c(v))2. The optimal
quality level from consumer’s a point of view, denoted va, is solution to the
following equation:
c(v) + 2vc′(v) = a (4)
The optimal quality level increases with a (i.e., dva
da
≥ 0). The wealthier
the population is, the larger the level of quality it seeks, - a rather intuitive
point. Then, on segment a of the market either a firm sells quality va defined
in equation (4) at marginal cost pa = c(va), or else it disappears. At equi-
librium qa,b = Da,b(va, c(va)) and the firm’s profit is 0 no matter the group
(a, b) it serves. Optimizing the net surplus of trade associated to group a of
consumers, S = aq − q2
2vb
− c(v)q, with respect to v and q yields va and qa,b.
The market allocation is Pareto efficient. We denote by S∗ the associated
surplus from trade.
S∗ =
bva
(
a− c(va)
)2
2
(5)
Now if quality is an experience attribute (i.e. if it is observable only after
purchasing the good) there is a potential quality signaling problem. Since
the firms can pretend to sell high quality and shirk, the consumers are not
ready to pay a high price for quality. However, when consumers are able
to detect ex-post fraudulent claims, there are several ways to successfully
signal quality to them. The most common, and cheapest one, consists in
offering a warranty contract along with the commodity. In case of repeated
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purchase reputation, sunk investments such as advertising, quality grading
or prices are other ways, though distortive, to signal quality.6 In this paper
we consider a guarantee system, assuming quality is ex-post verifiable. That
is, the product is sold with a guarantee specifying the quality level va and a
penalty rule in case of consumer deception. The credibility of the guarantee
contract depends upon the cost of deviating for the producer. It has to be
high enough so that providing quality is a dominant strategy for the firm.
This depends on the possibility to enforce the contract for the consumers
and on the amount of the penalty. This in turn depends on the efficiency of
the justice system, and on the existence of organizations, administrations or
associations, dedicated to the defense of consumers. In advanced economies
such public goods exist and guarantee contracts are commonly used to signal
quality in many different markets and for many different commodities (e.g.,
car, electrical appliance, construction, electronic, furniture, food). ”Satisfied
or reimbursed” is an extreme case of such a contract. It is not based on
anything verifiable, since individual satisfaction is not, but it is a credible –
because costly to enforce– signal of product quality which is experienced by
consumers.
With a guarantee added to the basic contract the consumers are willing
to pay for quality because it is in the best interest of the firms to produce
it. At equilibrium, the quality is as specified, and the guarantee contract
is not used. Then the cost to signal quality is low (basically the cost to
write the guarantee contract), though the cost to deviate from providing it is
potentially high (the penalty in case of consumer deception plus the loss of
reputation). When quality is observable by the consumers after purchasing
(e.g. through use), the under-provision problem can be solved at virtually
zero cost. Quality signaling does not change the market structure.
Proposition 1 When quality is verifiable, either before or after the pur-
chase, there is no signaling problem. Quality va, solution of equation (4),
is sold at marginal cost pa = c(va) so that the equilibrium quantity is qa,b =
va(a − c(va))b for the population in group (a, b). The outcome
[
(va, qa,b)
]
is
Pareto efficient.
6Grossman (1981) has studied the role of warranty. The role of price signals for ex-
perience goods was studied by Milgrom-Roberts (1986), Bagwell-Staiger (1989), Bagwell-
Riordan (1991) and Daughety-Reinganum (1995), and that of advertising by Schmalensee
(1979). In the same spirit Mahenc-Meunier (2000) look at the role of forward markets in
signaling quality and enhancing spot market efficiency. The role of reputation building
over time was first studied by Shapiro (1982,1983), and later by Grossman-Shapiro (1988)
and Falvey (1989). Jovanovic (1982) and Matthews-Postlethwaite (1985) were the first
to investigate the role of grading in signaling experience attribute, followed by Bourgeon-
Coestier (1996) and Hollander et al (1999).
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In the next section we study what happens to this outcome when quality
is unobservable.
2.2 Quality is a credence attribute
In this section, we assume that consumers never observe the quality level of
the products they purchase. This is true whether prior or after purchase.
There are many attributes of goods that are of this type. Examples include
nutritional contents of food, aircraft safety, chemical composition of a drug,
impact of a production process on the environment, age and working condi-
tions of the labor force... Then producers of poor quality can pretend to offer
high quality products; from the consumers’ perspective, they are not discern-
able. For instance, whether a shirt was manufactured by a child or by an
adult, it is the same shirt in the end. Yet many people disapprove of children
being put to work and are willing to pay a premium to avoid that happening.
It is the same with an environmentally friendly versus a polluting technol-
ogy. They cannot be told apart based on the final product. In this context,
a firm that would think of producing high quality v > v anticipates that
it will not be able to recover its cost, since consumers cannot discriminate
between low and high quality products (whether before or after purchasing).
It then supplies the minimal level. On the other hand, consumers anticipate
that since firms’ profits decrease with higher quality, they are going to offer
the minimum level, v, no matter which prices are posted or which quality
is claimed. They therefore purchase from the cheapest producers. At equi-
librium there is a unique quality level offered which is the minimum one. It
is competitively supplied at price p = c(v). A firm that would deviate from
this low quality/marginal cost pricing strategy would go bankrupt. The net
surplus falls to the level S.
S =
bv
(
a− c(v)
)2
2
(6)
The next proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2 When quality is not observable, there is a signaling problem.
The quality supplied falls to the minimum level v which is competitively of-
fered at marginal cost p = c(v). The equilibrium quantity is for the group
(a, b): q
a,b
= v
(
a− c(v)
)
b.
In the context of credence attributes, there is an incentive for the producer
to reduce quality, since reducing quality reduces cost but not demand. As
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an extreme case, whenever the minimum quality that can be supplied is very
low, the market collapses. That is, when v = 0, Da,b(v, c(v)) = 0 for any a.
Finally, by virtue of proposition 1, if there are different groups of wealth a
in the population, for instance rich and poor, there would, in the absence of
signaling problems, be as many quality levels offered as groups of wealth a.
Proposition 2 implies that not only does the quality level itself fall, but also
the variety of qualities offered.
3 Certification
When the quality is a credence attribute the market for quality collapses, no
matter what price consumers are willing to pay, and no matter what quality
producers are willing to provide. We may wonder whether traditional ways
of solving this quality problem can be helpful here. Unfortunately, with
credence attributes guarantee contract, signaling through prices or reputation
building are inefficient. Consumers cannot send back the product or boycott
it based on a poor quality since they do not experience it. In particular
they are unwilling to pay a premium based on the fact that the product they
purchase comes with a guarantee. With credence attributes, the solution is
certification. As explained in the introduction, certification may be defined
as a process whereby an unobservable quality level of some product is made
known to the consumer through some guarantee system, usually issued by
a third independent party. In other words, certification is a process for
transforming a credence attribute into a search attribute.
There are both product and process certification. Product certification is
linked mostly to consumption. For instance various certification or labeling
systems do occur in food and drink industries. This is the case with tradi-
tional drinks, such as French wines from Bordeaux or Burgundy. They are
signaled through a system of Appellation d’Origine Controˆle´e, which refer
to both the origin and the wine-making process. On the other hand process
certification is linked mostly to production. For instance the environmental
quality of goods, which refer to the impact of these goods on the natural
environment throughout their life cycle (their production, their consump-
tion, and their disposal), are typically credence attributes. In this case, a
way of signaling environmental quality are ecolabels. For instance in the US,
two private ecolabel organizations are Underwriters Laboratories, who is in
charge of the certification task for issuing the US Green Seal ecolabel, and
Scientific Certification Systems, who issues so-called ”Environmental Report
Cards” that gives a product score related to its environmental quality. A firm
may also submit itself to an environmental management certification process,
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such as the ISO 14000 norms system. Finally, whenever safety issues are at
stake, the certification process is usually put under government supervision.
Mandatory certification processes may then be imposed by regulation as is
for instance the case with pharmaceutical drugs (e.g. the Food and Drug
Administration in the USA.)
In all these cases, the cost of quality signaling is the cost of creating and
running a credible, independent, authority to enforce the denominations,
labels and brands. This cost is independent of the production cost of the
commodity to be certified. From the perspective of the firm, it is basically
a fixed cost, potentially a very high one. For instance the assessment of
biophysical, biochemical, and microbiological attributes of food and drugs
usually require costly equipment and highly trained and expensive personnel.
The monitoring of the resilience of pesticides in agricultural products is a
good example. In what follows, we study the incentives for an individual
firm to set up its own certification process. We will then turn to the study of
certification as a separate activity, whether under regulation or under private
supply.
3.1 Private self-certification
The certification cost is modeled as a fixed cost. We assume that the
quality level can be publicly assessed at cost K > 0. It is important to
distinguish the certification cost K from the cost of production c(v).
A firm can decide to invest K in order to make its quality credible to
the consumers.7 The important point here, is that no matter what way
certification is achieved, and contrary to a guarantee contract which is never
used at equilibrium, the certification cost has to be paid before the purchase
can take place. For quality to be a credible signal, the certification cost
has to be sunk. This implies that even if the market is a priori competitive,
because of the certification cost which adds to the production cost, it becomes
oligopolistic with N producers. That is, with a given number of firms, perfect
competition is impossible if K > 0. Indeed the firm that chooses to certify its
quality needs to invest K. For certification to be worthwhile, the profit of the
firm must be greater than K. Depending on K (and on consumers’ wealth
a and market size b) the market structure that is going to emerge varies
widely. We model competition among firms as a Cournot oligopoly (i.e., a
Nash equilibrium). Since in general it is easier for a firm to change the price or
the quantity it produces than the production process itself, we consider that
quality choice is irreversible with respect to the price or quantity decision
7We assume that the certification process is perfect. In reality the certification process
is imperfect such that the quality is in probability (for a discussion on this point see the
literature quoted in the introduction).
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which is flexible. This implies that in the strategic game they play the
firms choose first quality and then quantity. We may establish the following
preliminary result:
Lemma 2 The firm that decides to certify its production chooses to supply
to group a of consumers the quality level va defined by equation (4).
Proof: Consider first the case of a single producer that has sunk K. The
monopoly maximizes with respect to v and p: ΠM = v(a − p)b(p − c(v)).
It is straightforward to check that he chooses vM = va solution of equation
(4) and that pM =
1
2
(a + c(va)). Now if several firms enter the market for a
certified good, the individual profit depends on the competitor’s quality/price
strategy. We solve it backwards. We consider the price of any firm j = 1, .., N
given a quality vector (v∗1, ..., v
∗
N). By virtue of lemma 1 consumers purchase
from the firm that maximizes vh(a−ph)2. It implies that if there exists a firm
h = 1, .., N such that pj > a− ( v
∗
j
v∗
h
)0.5(a− p∗h) then qj = 0 and Πj = −K. At
the equilibrium pj = a− ( v
∗
j
v∗
h
)0.5(a− p∗h) for any j, h ∈ {1, .., N}. Substituting
pj in the profit expression, and denoting αj the firm’s market share in the
total demand, we get Πj = αjvj(a − pj)b(pj − c(vj)) − K. Optimizing Πj
with respect to vj yields vj = va with va solution to equation (4). QED
By virtue of lemma 2, at any certification equilibrium, the quality equi-
librium is va. Then on the market segment (a, b) the firms’ production are
perfect substitutes. There remains to consider the firm’s choice in quan-
tity. The relevant equilibrium concept is Nash. Let Q−j =
∑
h 6=j qh de-
note total production excluding that of firm j and Q =
∑N
j=1 qj the total
quantity including firm j. The firm j(= 1, .., N) chooses its quantity qj
such as to maximize: Maxqj Πj(qj, Q−j) = P (qj +Q−j, va)qj − c(va)qj. Since
P (q, v) = a − q
bv
, this yields qj = va(a − c(va))b − Q. The firms are there-
fore symmetric, and the equilibrium is symmetric: qj = Q/N . Hence, the
equilibrium quantity, depending on N ≥ 1, the total number of firms in the
industry, is Q(N) = N
N+1
va
(
a − c(va)
)
b. That is, Q(N) = N
N+1
qa,b, with
qa,b being the first best outcome. Accordingly the total quantity supplied
increases with the intensity of the competition. For N = 1 we get the tra-
ditional monopoly solution, for N = 2 the Cournot duopoly solution, and
for N → ∞ the competitive outcome as described in section 2.1. The con-
sumers’ surplus, denoted SN , when they purchase the certified commodity, is
SN = bva
2
(a − P (Q(N), va))2. Substituting Q(N) by its value, and recalling
that S∗ defined (5) is the first best surplus, it is straightforward to check that
SN =
(
N
N + 1
)2
S∗. (7)
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We deduce that if N ≥ 1 the consumers in group wealth a have the choice
between purchasing a relatively expensive, high quality certified commodity
which yields net surplus SN , or a cheap, low quality uncertified version which
yields S defined by (6). They will purchase the certified commodity if and
only if SN ≥ S. This condition is equivalent to N
N+1
≥ ( S
s∗ )
0.5 = (v)
0.5
(va)0.5
a−c(v)
a−c(va) .
By definition of va, we have va(a− c(va))2 ≥ v(a− c(v))2 which implies that
(v)0.5
(va)0.5
a−c(v)
a−c(va) ≤ 1. Then if v is very low (close to zero), from the consumers’
point of view, certification, even with a monopoly, is always better than
perfect competition without certification. Moreover, for a given number of
firms, N , in the industry, certification will be preferred more often by a rich
population than by a poor one. That is, from the definition of va defined in
equation (4) the gap between va(a− c(va))2 − v(a− c(v))2 increases with a.
Then everything else being equal, a richer population prefers more often a
certified commodity than a poor one, an intuitive result.
We compute next the per capita profit assuming that consumers decide
to purchase the certified commodity. The profit of a firm, which depends on
N , the total number of firms in competition, is Π(N) = vab(
a−c(va)
N+1
)2. That
is: Π(N) = 2
(N+1)2
S∗. Accordingly, the individual profit decreases in N and
converges to zero as competition intensifies (i.e., when N goes to infinity).
At the certification equilibrium the number of firms, denoted N(K), is the
maximal integer such that Π(N)−K ≥ 0. That is,
N(K) = INT
{(
2S∗
K
)0.5 − 1}. (8)
The next proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the
certification equilibrium to hold.
Proposition 3 When quality is a credence attribute, the self-certification
equilibrium prevails if and only if
S∗ ≥
[
S0.5 + (2K)0.5 + (S + 2K)0.5
2
]2
(9)
Then the market structure is oligopolistic with N(K) producers defined by
equation (8). Otherwise, the low quality/low price equilibrium prevails.
Proof: The certification equilibrium prevails if and only if there ex-
ists an N ≥ 1 integer such that (i) S∗ ≥ (N+1)2
2
K (i.e., the producers
are willing to produce) and (ii) S∗ ≥ (1 + 1
N
)2S (i.e., the consumers are
willing to purchase) hold simultaneously. Inequality (i) is equivalent to
N ≤
(
2S∗
K
)0.5 − 1, and (ii) to N ≥ 1
( 2S∗
K
)
0.5−1
. Since S∗ < S, (i) and (ii)
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hold simultaneously if and only if there exists N ≥ 1 integer such that:
1
( 2S∗
K
)
0.5−1
≤ N ≤
(
2S∗
K
)0.5 − 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for such
an integer to exist is that:
(
2S∗
K
)0.5 − 1− 1
( 2S∗
K
)
0.5−1
≥ 1.5 This is equivalent
to: S∗ − (S∗)0.5[S0.5 + (2K)0.5] + (KS)0.5 ≥ 0. We solve the second degree
equation in (S∗)0.5 and find two roots (S∗−)
0.5 = S
0.5+(2K)0.5−(S+2K)0.5
2
and
(S∗+)
0.5 = S
0.5+(2K)0.5+(S+2K)0.5
2
. Condition (i) and (ii) hold simultaneously if
and only if S∗ ≤ S∗− or S∗ ≥ S∗+. Since S∗− is lower than S, we are left with
(S∗+)
0.5. We deduce easily condition (9).QED
We deduce from (9) a necessary condition for voluntary certification to
hold by putting S = 0.
S∗ ≥ 2K. (10)
By virtue of proposition 3 the larger is a or b, the easier it is for condition (9)
to hold. Figure 1 illustrates these results. It represents the N(K) function for
two different levels of wealth a′ > a. We deduce that the certification equilib-
rium appears less often for poorer populations. It appears also less often for
smaller populations. That is, the critical level of the fixed cost K, such that
the certification equilibrium is no longer sustainable, increases with a and b.
This implies that if the fixed certification cost, K, is such that Kˆ < K < Kˆ ′,
a rich (and/or large) population purchases high quality/certified commodities
and a poor (and/or small) one low quality/uncertified commodities.
[Figure 1]
Proposition 3 then helps us to understand that in a given population
there might be a market segmentation. The rich choose to purchase certi-
fied commodities while the poor buy low quality, uncertified commodities.
More importantly, it helps us to understand the difference in certification
levels across countries. Indeed developed countries consume more certified
commodities than developing ones. The last section of the paper, which
deals with the example of agricultural seed certification, provides a detailed
illustration of this segmentation problem. Comparing the self-certification
equilibrium with the optimum yields the following result.
Corollary 1 The level of self-certification is sub-optimal.
Proof: By virtue of proposition 3, the certification equilibrium prevails
if and only if S∗ ≥
[
S0.5+(2K)0.5+(S+2K)0.5
2
]2
. On the other hand certifica-
tion is efficient if and only if S∗ ≥ K + S. One can check that K + S ≤[
S0.5+(2K)0.5+(S+2K)0.5
2
]2
.QED
14
-6
Kˆ Kˆ ′
N
3
2
1
0
N(K) = 2
N(K) = 1
N(K) = 0
K
n(K)
n′(K)
Figure 1: Self-Certification Equilibrium
n(K) = (b/K)1/2[a− c(va)](va)1/2 − 1
3
The welfare losses involved in the self-certification equilibrium are poten-
tially high. The problems surrounding pharmaceutical practice in developing
countries illustrates this phenomenon. The people who are too poor to buy
official medicines in drugstores have to rely on those available on the street.
Of course, market drugs sold out on the street are uncertified. A study in
Nigeria concluded that up to 60% of medicines on the street market were
counterfeit. Unchecked counterfeit drugs can be very dangerous. It is sim-
ply safer not to consume them. This leaves the population with traditional
remedies.8 The social cost of this equilibrium is very high. A centralized in-
tervention, such as government regulation, can be a valuable remedy to this
type of market failure. This leads us to the study of an optimal certification
policy.
3.2 Optimal certification policy
There are increasing returns to scale in certification. Self-certification
leads to wasteful duplication of certification costs among downstream firms.
To strengthen the credibility of the certification process, the government
should thus encourage the creation of an independent certification firm or
firms, depending on market size, and regulate it to avoid consumer deception
or abuse of monopoly power. If this is not sufficient (i.e., if no private entity
is eager to enter the certification business), the government might choose to
monopolize the market for certification while setting up a public certification
agency.
Setting up an independent certification body costs K. We study the
optimal certification policy under two financial arrangements. In the first
one, the state takes directly in charge the certification cost. It relies on
public funds to finance the cost of the process. As illustrated in the last
section of the paper, this solution is often favored by developing countries
generally with the help of international aid. On the other hand, wealthy
nations are reluctant to rely on their public funds to finance the certification
of private commodities. Indeed this solution would increase the tax burden
that is already quite heavy. Moreover it raises the issue of cross-subsidies
when the general taxpayers do not directly benefit from the certification
process. Rich countries favor a self-financed certification system with a fee
levied on the certified good.
3.2.1 We first consider the case of public funded certification. We assume
that the government is utilitarian. It maximizes the sum of consumers’ sur-
plus, S(p, v) = bv
2
(a−p)2, plus the firms’ profits, Π(p, v) = (p−c(v))bv(a−p),
8Then a survey in Zimbabwe suggests that 80% of the population relies on traditional
remedies because people are too poor to buy official medicines and those available on the
street are very unreliable.
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minus the cost of funding the certification fixed cost, −(1 + λ)K. The term
λ ≥ 0 denotes the shadow cost of public funding. It is greater than 0 be-
cause it is distorting to raise taxes. Since the firms’ cost function is linear,
the utilitarian objective function is maximized by setting price equal to the
marginal cost p = c(v). In the case of a direct public funding of K, the
regulator solves:
Max
v
W (v) =
bv
2
(
a− c(v)
)2 − (1 + λ)K. (11)
The solution to problem (11) is the first-best level quality va defined in equa-
tion (4). The quantity produced is that of the first best level qa,b defined in
proposition 1. We deduce the value of the net social surplus of public funded
certification Sλ.
Sλ = S∗ − (1 + λ)K (12)
When λ is close to 0, this solution is close to the first best. On the other
hand, when λ is large, the net surplus decreases and might even become
negative. For the certification of private goods, wealthy nations, whose λ
(often assessed to be around 0.3) is quite high, prefer to rely on the final
users.
3.2.2 We next consider the case of a self-funded regime. The certification
process is funded by a fee, denoted τ(v), on the quantities certified. It is
linear in quantity, but it depends non linearly on the level of quality to be
ascertained. It can be implemented by a public or by a private body.9 We
assume that the certification firm or agency chooses τ(v) such as to break
even. This assumption is consistent with the market for certification being
either regulated or contestable. The optimal tax rate, chosen to just cover
the certification cost, satisfies the following equation.
τ(v)bv
(
a− [c(v) + τ(v)]
)
= K (13)
We deduce from equation (13) that
τ ′(v) =
−τ
[(
a− [c(v) + τ(v)]
)
− c′(v)v
]
v
(
a− [c(v) + 2τ(v)]
) (14)
Certification is now an input in the production process to the downstream
firms. The generalized marginal cost of the commodity for the producers is
c(v) + τ(v) if they choose to certify, and c(v) otherwise. Therefore the cost
9For practical matters there can be several certification firms if the demand is large,
and they have fixed maximal capacity.
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function, C(q) = (c(v) + τ(v))q, is linear in quantity. It remains compatible
with perfect competition. Under the competitive pressure the firms set their
price at p = c(v)+τ(v) and they choose quality to maximize the net consumer
surplus S(p, v). They solve:
Max
v
bv
2
(
a− [c(v) + τ(v)]
)2
. (15)
Using equation (14), one can check that the solution to the level of quality
in (15) is the first best level va defined in equation (4). Then at equilibrium
the optimal tax rate, chosen to cover the certification cost, satisfies τbva
(
a−
[c(va) + τ ]
)
= K. This second degree equation admits 2 roots. Solving it for
τa ∈ [0, 1], we find that a necessary condition for the project to be profitable
is [a − c(va)]2 − 4Kbva ≥ 0. This is equivalent to S∗ ≥ 2K which is also a
necessary condition for self-certification being profitable (see equation (10)).
Then the equilibrium tax level is
τa,b =
(
a− c(va)
)
−
(
[a− c(va)]2 − 4Kbva ]
)1/2
2
. (16)
The equilibrium quantity is qτa,b = bva
(
a − [c(va) + τa]
)
which is less than
the first best level qa,b = bva
(
a− c(va)
)
. Due to the substitution effect, there
is a deadweight loss of the tax τa,b. We deduce the net social surplus when
relying on a self-funded regime.
Sτ =
S∗
4
(
1 + (1− 2K
S∗ )
0.5
)2
(17)
Comparing this regime with self-certification yields the following result.
Lemma 3 Private self-certification is never optimal.
Proof: Comparing Sτ defined in equation (17) with SN defined in equation(7)
at N = N(K), that is SN = (
( 2S
∗
K
)0.5−1
( 2S
∗
K
)0.5
)2S∗, yields SN ≤ Sτ as soon as
2K ≤ S∗. QED
This result is very natural. The existence of an independent body to carry
out the certification process is preferable to individual firms trying each to
perform self-certification. Self-certification is inefficient because individual
firms need to invest heavily in order to make the outcome of certification
credible. On the other hand an independent certification agency has no
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Figure 2: Optimal Certification Policy
conflict of interests in the certification process. It is the cheapest way to
generate consumer confidence. With a single certification firm or agency the
fixed costs are not duplicated (the two regimes are equivalent when N =
1). Accordingly in free-market economies voluntary certification is generally
carried out by independent firms or organizations.
3.2.3 Finally we compare independent certification, either publicly or pri-
vately funded, with no certification at all, to derive the optimal certification
policy.
Proposition 4 Under the assumption that 2S ≤ K, the optimal certification
policy is not to certify if S
∗
K
≤ min
{
S
K
+ 1 + λ, 2
}
, and to certify otherwise.
In the latter case the publicly funded regime is preferable to the self-funded
regime if and only if
λ ≤ λˆ = (
S∗
K
− 1)−
(
(S
∗
K
− 1)− 1
)0.5
2
. (18)
Proof: Certification through public funding is better than no certification
if and only if Sλ ≥ S. This is equivalent to S∗
K
≥ S
K
+1+λ. Similarly market
funded certification, which requires S∗ ≥ 2K, is better than no certification
if and only if Sτ ≥ S. This is equivalent to
(
1 − 2K
S∗
)0.5 ≥ 2( S
K
)0.5 − 1
when S∗ ≥ 2K. Under the assumption 2S ≤ K, S∗ ≥ 2K implies that
S∗ ≥ 4S and thus that 2
(
S
K
)0.5 − 1 ≤ 0. We deduce that market funded
certification through a linear tax is better than no certification if and only
if S
∗
K
≥ 2. Finally a publicly funded regime is preferable to a self-funded
regulation regime if and only if Sτ ≤ Sλ as defined equations (17) and (12).
This is equivalent to: λ ≤ S∗
4K
(
1 − (1 − 2k
S∗ )
0.5
)2
. Developing the right hand
side yields (18). QED
The next figure illustrates proposition 4. It represents the optimal certi-
fication policy in the (S
∗
K
;λ) space.
[FIGURE 2]
The optimal choice between market funded certification (i.e. market ori-
ented certification) or public funded certification, depends on the value of
the shadow cost of public funding. For a low value of λ, public funding is
less distorting than a linear tax levied on certified product. On the other
hand, when λ increases it is more and more costly to rely on public funds.
The market oriented regime becomes preferable. Finally when the ratio of
the net social surplus over the fixed cost of certification becomes small, it is
preferable not to certify at all.
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4 Agricultural seed certification
We now propose to illustrate the foregoing model using the certification of
agricultural seed. One reason for this choice is its importance in a world of
increasing populations in need of food and fiber. Another is that such an
investigation has not, to our knowledge at least, yet been undertaken. The
fact that seed is a production input, rather than a consumer good, is not
important: in both cases, we are interested in the demand of the certified
good as a function of cost. Even if production is exported, we are still
interested in whether farmers will choose to invest in certified seed or not.
4.1 Background, problem and hypotheses
Farmers around the world can have access to several sorts of seed for a
given produce. They can use home-grown seed, saved from last year’s har-
vest, or they can purchase it on the market. If purchased on the market, they
can choose, at some extra cost, certified seed, or be content with uncertified
seed. The value of certified seed is twofold. Firstly, it guarantees a minimum
quality, and secondly, it guarantees a maximum sensitivity to specific agro-
nomic conditions (climate, disease, pest tolerance). The seed embodies the
outcome of scientific investments. It leads to substituting new genetic mate-
rial and knowledge to land, labor and capital. Then certification should pro-
vide reliable and credible information on the productive performance of the
seed. Highly trained plant scientists equipped with sophisticated equipment
in dedicated private or public laboratories provide reliability and credibility
in rich countries.
To some, seed may appear to be a good characterized by experience at-
tributes rather than credence attributes. However, increased yields and pro-
ductivity remain conditional on how the cropping system is managed. Cer-
tified seed provides the potential for improvements, not the improvements
themselves. These need an appropriate technological package, which includes
the timing and conditions of seeding, follow-up cultivation, the type and tim-
ing of fertilizer, herbicide and pesticide applications, up to the timing and
conditions of harvest. This is why certified seed suppliers usually provide
such an information package along with the seed material itself. Farmers
pay for the whole package, not just the genetic material. Now if seed per-
forms poorly, it will be difficult to decide whether this is due to poor farmer
decision-making or to poor seed potential. However, after several years of
trials by several farmers in a given region, the seed may become something
of a hybrid containing both credence and experience attributes. Until then,
it must be considered as a credence good. Then, if the logic of the model
is correct, there are at least two hypotheses that we would like to test when
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applied to national scale seed certification.
Hypothesis 1 : Under laissez-faire there is a high correlation between a
nation’s wealth, and the degree to which its farmers use certified seed.
Hypothesis 2 : Under a public funded program the level of certification
is much higher than what would have occurred under laissez-faire. Such a
program occurs when the funds used to finance it come at a low cost (e.g.,
through foreign aid).
Finally there is an additional hypothesis that we would like to consider.
It is not a direct implication of the formal analysis, but it is relevant for the
particular application we are considering.
Hypothesis 3 : Seed certification is an important factor in achieving high
agricultural productivity.
If hypotheses 1 and 3 turn out to be true, a corollary is that under
laissez-faire richer countries achieve, for similar products, higher productivity
whereas poorer countries should be trapped in low-performance levels. By
the same reasoning, if hypotheses 2 and 3 turn out to be true, a corollary is
that under public funded certification, poor countries should also be able to
achieve high-performance levels.
4.2 The data
To investigate the validity of the foregoing hypotheses, and, through this,
the empirical relevance of the theoretical model applied to seed certification,
data was found and compiled from an FAO database, downloadable from the
Internet.10 The data set consisted of files on seed certification for a number
of countries around the world. Not all files contained useful quantitative
information. Many, if not most OECD countries were not represented, or
had inadequate data, with the most conspicuous absence being the USA.11
Only 40 files contained exploitable information, generating a total of 40 data
points. Unfortunately, no data set more recent than 1990 was found, and
its general quality and reliability must be seen as poor. Conclusions to this
study will need to be qualified by this proviso.
Useful information came in the form of tables giving, for each major crop
grown in the country, the quantities of non-certified, certified and total seed
used, and the areas sown with non-certified and certified seed. This allowed
10This data needs to be downloaded separately for each country and reformatted ap-
propriately in order to allow for statistical calculation.
11All efforts to obtain information on seed certification in the USA, whether from public
or private sources, failed. It seems that the USA has no organized database on seed
certification, presumably because the market for certification being very large (i.e., because
a and b are both very large in the USA), it is left to a decentralized and competitive private
sector that views such information as sensitive.
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the calculation of certification ratios for each crop and each country. There
was a choice between using quantity-based and area-based certification ratios.
The former appeared the better one as it better represents the total use of
certified seed, and therefore the costs incurred. Two equal land areas may
represent two very different quantities of seed used.
Because different countries grow different crops, overall certification ratios
had to be computed, providing aggregate figures. At the same time, specific
ratios were computed for staple crops like wheat and rice. Maize was left
out because of technical reasons: it is a hybrid crop for which certification
is a necessity. The correlation between the certification of staple crops and
overall certification seems to be good.
Auxiliary data included GDP per head (a measure for a), plus arable
land area, agricultural output, and agricultural production factors: labor,
tractors, fertilizers, and irrigation. This information is available in the FAO
Production Yearbook series and the FAO Fertilizer Yearbook series. The
dates used were 1985, 1990 and 1995. To minimize problems of climatic vari-
ability, three-year moving averages were used (1984-86, 89-91, 94-96). Three
levels of aggregation were considered for agricultural production: cereals only,
all crops, and aggregate agricultural produce. We considered tractors and
fertilizer use per arable hectare, and percentage of farmland irrigated. Labor
was recorded as the active population in agriculture per hectare of arable
land. Data was recorded only for those countries for which certification data
was available.
4.3 Analysis
Hypothesis 1 and 2
Firstly, some simple statistics were carried out to examine the empiri-
cal relationship between GDP/head and quantity-based certification ratios.
Figure 3 shows the quantity-based certification ratios as a function of the
GDP/head.
[FIGURE 3]
Figure 3 actually reveals two different groups of countries. One group is
clustered in the upper left-hand part of the graph, while the other roughly
follows a direct positive relationship between GDP/head and quantity-based
certification ratios. We dubbed this latter set ’Group A countries’ and
those clustered around the upper left-hand corner ’Group B countries’.12
The original FAO information files were re-examined, only to find out that
12Finland appears as a clear outlier. It has one of the highest GDP/head yet only 10%
quantity-based certification ratio. However, it hails 94.6% certification for its cropped
land, a discrepancy not obvious to unravel.
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group B countries were those that had developed a strong, voluntary state-
controlled certification program usually with the international aid from or-
ganizations such as the FAO. They all represent so-called less developed
countries (LDCs). A distinction was made between the wealthier and the
poorer end of the spectrum in group A countries.13 In terms of GDP/head,
poor group A and group B are similar; in terms of certification ratios, rich
group A and group B are similar. The similarity holds for staples like wheat
and rice. Thus, in group B, the state substitutes itself for the market to pro-
vide certification. In this case, high certification ratios are correlative with
low GDP/head as predicted by the model.
We next ran simple linear regressions to evaluate the influence of GDP/head
on certification.14 An initial model was run without the use of a dummy
variable representing a country’s belonging to group A or B. Such a model
performs very poorly (R2 = .06). By adding a dummy identifying group A
and B, things improve dramatically. Even so, as expected, GDP is a poor
predictor for group B countries, but a good predictor for group A countries.
For the whole sample: Adjusted R2 = 0.81 (Prob > F at 1%)
CERT = −65 + 0.0045GDP + 68DUM
(-6.8) (9.7) (11.9) (t values)
For group A: Adjusted R2 = 0.82 (Prob > F at 1%)
CERT = 2.8 + 0.0045GDP
(-0.6) (9.9) (t values)
According to these regressions an increase of one point of GDP/head
increases the quantity-based certification ratio by 0.0045. Moreover, as pre-
dicted by the theory, in countries where a public funded certification program
exists, the certification ratio is much higher than the level predicted other-
wise. Conditional to the fact that a public funded certification program
exists the quantity-based certification ratio increases by 68%. Government
certification occurs in countries that have low shadow cost of public fund.
That is, in countries that received foreign aid to implement a certification
program. The foregoing results are very preliminary and incomplete. They
seem, nevertheless, to corroborate hypotheses 1 and 2. In checking hypoth-
esis 3, we shall next see whether such policies indeed achieve their purpose:
higher agricultural productivity.
Hypothesis 3
The next question was to examine, particularly for group B countries,
13Making the most of a gap between $7,000 and $10,000 in the data, ”poor” countries
were identified in the less than $7,000 GDP/head category (with most in the less than
$3,000), and ”rich” countries in the more than $10,000 GDP/head.
14Non-linear specifications including a squared GDP term did not improve the model.
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whether their certification effort yielded any results. Because certification
programs entail a certain time lag for production results to be felt, the three-
year average around the 1995 data set was used with the 1990 certification
data. In terms of the output variable, there was a choice amongst several
options in the FAO database: actual cereal yields, crop production indices
relative to a base year, and increases in production indices over a period of
time. Only the cereal output data yielded any significant results. Thus, these
were used for testing hypothesis 3. The following linear regression model was
used:
CERY LD = f(CERT, FERT, TRACT,LAB, IRRIG,DUM)
where:
CERY LD = cereal yields, in tons per hectare
CERT = certification ratio (%), as explained earlier
FERT = kg of fertilizers per ha of arable land area
TRACT = number of tractors per ha of arable land area
LAB = active population in agriculture per ha of arable land area
IRRIG = percentage of arable land irrigated
DUM = dummy variable for each group (A=1, B=2), only for aggregate
model
In the aggregate model (whole sample), certification appears not to be
a significant explanatory factor. Instead, fertilizers and labor are the most
important variable. Excluding the non-significant regressors: Adj R2 =
0.70.
CERY LD = 1918 + 9.4FERT − 0.3LAB
(8.3) (8.7) (- 2.9) (t values)
When the sample was split between the two groups A and B, a new
picture emerged. Certification appeared as the most significant factor. In
group A, excluding the non significant regressors: Adj R2 = 0.77
CERY LD = 795 + 21CERT + 11FERT + 21IRRIG− 15TRACT
(1.4) (1.0) (3.7) (2.1) (-2.0) (t values).
For group B, however, its significance worked the other way around. Its
regression coefficient was negative, implying a negative impact of certification
on cereal productivity: Adj R2 = 0.73.
CERY LD = 4255− 28CERT + 13FERT + 21IRRIG− 0.5LAB
(4.3) (-2.6) (4.6) (-1.1) (- 0.5) (t values)
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This result proved robust under various model specifications. Interpreting
it is not obvious. In fact, the available data has not allowed us to come up
with a satisfactory explanation.
One possibility is that the relationship works indeed the other way around.
That is, in countries with very low productivity, efforts are made to im-
prove the situation. Voluntary certification in poor countries is then the
signal of very low productivity. A regression was run by inverting CERY LD
and CERT as dependant and explanatory variables, in the form CERT =
f(CERY LD, other variables). The resulting model is of lesser quality (R-
square of 0.48 instead of 0.73), which suggests the answer lies elsewhere.
Another possibility lay in the dimensions of the variables, defined per
hectare of land. Accordingly, another model was constructed with the orig-
inal data, using total rather than per hectare values, and the area of arable
land itself was entered as an extra variable. There were no major changes
in the results (certification retains its negative coefficient for group B), and
this model was not as good as the original.
It may also simply be that our data are too aggregated and of too poor
quality. For instance, labor input also appeared with a negative coefficient
with respect to cereal yields, which might seem preposterous. However, at
the aggregate level, higher labor inputs are correlated with lower technology
and therefore with lower yields. Other, hidden, variables are at play. This is
likely to also be the case for certification.
In conclusion, hypotheses 1 and 3 appear to be corroborated, in the light
of these preliminary findings. It is true, given the above evidence for the
countries where there is no voluntary state-planned certification program,
that certification is a function of national income or wealth, reflecting the
weight of the underlying costs of certification. It is also true that certifica-
tion does contribute, in an important way, to the agricultural performance
of these countries, at least as measured by cereal production.15 Where cer-
tification appears as a significant factor in explaining cereal productivity,
equally significant values of other explanatory variables: fertilizers, tractors,
irrigation suggest colinearity. Certification obviously does not lead by itself
to higher productivity; rather, it is an element of a composite technological
and institutional package. This suggestion was tested by creating composite
variables representing various such packages. However, none of these played
a significant role in explaining cereal productivity. Although one would think
that certification is part of a larger technical-institutional package, the data
15This is not as restrictive as it may seem, because, including wheat, rice and maize, by
far the world’s three major staples, it covers the greater part of crop production in most
countries. On the other hand, pasture and forage products linked to animal production
are not captured by this measure.
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have not permitted a positive test of this idea.
In the case of countries that have initiated a government based certifi-
cation program, generally with the help of international aid,16 hypothesis 2
seems to be vindicated. In these countries, as predicted by our theoretical
model, the level of certification should otherwise be zero. On the other hand
hypothesis 3 seems to be wrong. Certification does not appear to contribute
towards agricultural (cereal) productivity. In fact, certification seems to be
related to it negatively. This unexpected result might reflect the fact that the
certified seeds which perform very well when properly used, are very sensitive
to seeding condition and climatic variations. Then these seeds might simply
be unfitted for many developing countries, especially those where rainfall is
rare and unpredictable (e.g. sub-Sahara area). More importantly this un-
expected result might reflect our initial assumption of perfect certification,
where credibility is taken to be 100%. In many developing countries, this is a
strong assumption and does not appear to be warranted (the case of Ghana
appears illustrative). Future work is needed to investigate in similar model
a probabilistic formulation of certification, where the confidence of farmers
in certified seed is less than perfect.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the problem of quality certification when quality is a
credence attribute and certification is perfect. It has shown that the costlier
the certification process, the fewer will be the firms able to afford certification.
In this sense certification cost is a major factor in deciding market structure,
with high costs leading to a monopoly for certification, and ultimately to no
certification at all. In this case the market for quality collapses. The certi-
fication equilibrium is also influenced by the wealth level of the population.
For a rich population a certification equilibrium might prevail, whereas with
a poor one it might not. We have shown that certification through an in-
dependent certification body always dominates self-certification. Whether it
should be funded by a fee on the certified product or by public funds, depends
on the shadow cost of public funding. In developing countries where there are
external organizations eager to fund the certification program, the shadow
cost of funding is close to 0 (at least in theory). These countries should rely
on public funding. On the other hand, in rich countries the shadow cost of
public funding is high because the tax burden is already very high. It is
better to rely on a fee to finance the certification process.
16Funding through certified product fees is not possible in countries whose problem is
precisely that farmers lack enough money to generate an effective demand for certification.
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These ideas were confronted with the issue of agricultural seed certifica-
tion. Although the available data was limited in both quantity and quality,
the relationship between levels of average income and levels of certification
is verified for countries with market-based certification (that is, provided
through the private sector). In countries with government provision, GDP
per head, as expected, is not a good predictor of certification levels, es-
pecially where international aid is relied on. Finally a difficulty appeared
regarding the efficiency of government-funded seed certification. One would
have expected that these often voluntary certification programs would have
had some positive (though lagged) impact on agricultural productivity. In-
stead, the data revealed a negative impact. We were not able to explain away
what appears as an anomaly, and it is not obvious whether the data is at
stake. For government-based certification schemes, it is likely that there is
more at stake than what is accounted for in our model.
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